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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for recovery of damages for personal 
injuries and resulting damages sustained by plaintiff 
Matthew C. Harris (and his father, plaintiff Gary s. Harris) 
when the jeep in which Matthew was riding collided with a 
Utah Transit Authority bus. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial by jury, a verdict was rendered in 
favor of defendants finding them not negligent. Judgment 
was entered accordingly. Plaintiffs made a Motion for a 
New Trial, which Motion was denied by the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Matthew c. Harris and Gary S. Harris seek 
reversal of the trial court's Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 7, 1977, at approximately 8:15 a.m., at the 
T-intersection of 1700 North on Washington Blvd., in North 
Ogden, Utah, a collision occurred betweeen a jeep, driven 
by Rodney c. Talbot, and a Utah Transit Authority (U.T.A.) 
bus, driven by defendant Lester Lorenzo Loosemore (550, 
552, 629-30). 1 
Plaintiff Matthew Harris was 17 years of age and was 
riding as a passenger in the Jeep which was being driven 
1 References to the Record are indicated by parentheti-
cal page numbers. 
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by Rodney C. Talbot (547, 665). Matthew was riding in the 
outside passenger seat of the Jeep (547). Another boy, Kevin 
Della Lucia, was· sitting between Matthew and Talbot (547). 
The boys were on an errand for their high school teacher 
(546). The jeep was in good mechanical condition and the 
day was dry and clear (548). The jeep was travelling with 
the flow of traffic, between 40 and 50 m.p.h. (521, 549, 
567, 577, 591, 728). 
Washington Boulevard, at the point of the collision, 
has four traffic lanes, two northbound and two southbound 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1). The impact occurred in the 
outside, southbound lane (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1). 
The U.T.A. bus was stopping, or had just stopped, to 
pick up a passenger, when the collision occurred (561). 
The U.T.A. bus was positioned with its right outer wheel 
four inches off the pavement (514, Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
Nos. 3-16). The bus obstructed a substantial part of the 
outside travel lane (629). 
There was a shoulder of packed road-base adjacent to 
the roadway (518). The condition of this shoulder was such 
that on the day of the accident, a bus could have pulled off 
the roadway onto the shoulder (503, 518-19, 624-25). 2 
2 Police photographs clearly illustrate the accident scene 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 3-16). Other photographs 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 1, 17-20), and a scale diagram 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2) further illustrate the scene. 
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Talbot, driver of the jeep, did not recall seeing the bus 
ahead of him until just before the collision (558). At that 
time, he looked up and saw the bus, glanced at his rear-view 
mirror, swerved left and braked to avoid the bus (550, 558). 
In the course of this maneuver, the right side of the 
Jeep struck the left rear corner of the bus in such a way 
as to pinch the right arm of Matthew Harris between the bus 
and the Jeep, effectively severing the arm between the 
shoulder and elbow, with resulting severe and permanent 
injuries (535, 660-61, 668-75). Matthew has no recollection 
of the collision whatsoever (667). 
During trial, the court excluded an exhibit offered 
by plaintiffs, which showed the repair history, subsequent 
to the date of the accident, of the involved Utah Transit 
Authority bus (698-700). 
The court ruled that Rodney Talbot, driver of the 
Jeep in which plaintiff Matthew Harris was a passenger, was 
negligent as a matter of law, but submitted the issue of 
Loosemore's negligence to the jury (253). The court denied 
plaintiff's motion that the court find defendant Loosemore 
~ negligent as a matter of law (817). 
The case was submitted to a jury, which returned its 
verdict finding that defendants were not negligent (235). 
• Judgment was entered on the verdict (406). Plaintiffs moved 
,_ for a new trial, which was denied (407, 476) • 
ne1 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
RODNEY TALBOT WAS NEGLIGENT 
The court ruled that Rodney Talbot was negligent as a 
matter of law, and so instructed the jury (253). The court 
could only make such a ruling if it determined that reason-
able minds could not differ on the issue of Talbot's negli-
gence. Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 
134 P.567 (1913). 
However, there was substantial evidence in the record 
which, if believed, could have pursuaded reasonable minds 
that Talbot was not negligent. Such evidence on this issue 
consisted, in part, of the following. 
There was substantial evidence that there were no tail 
lights or signals operating on the rear of the bus immedi-
ately prior to the accident. Police Chief Earl Carroll 
(504-05), Rodney Talbot (551), Kevin Della-Lucia (568), Helen 
Hollingshead (578), Robert Freston (588) and Gloria Myers 
(593, 594) all observed the rear of the bus either immedi-
ately before the accident, or within minutes thereafter. 
All testified either that they recalled no lights, or that 
they specifically looked for lights on the bus and saw none. 
No witness saw lights on the bus at the time of the acci-
dent or immediately thereafter. 
-4-
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Additionally, plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 40 and 41, 
received in evidence, were the relevant maintenance records 
of the involved bus for the time period prior to the acci-
dent, and a summary thereof (218-19). These exhibits showed 
that the involved bus had experienced several electrical 
failures in the lighting and related systems prior to the 
accident. 
Emmett Quinn, an expert in the field of accident recon-
struction, testified that, absent stop signal lights, the 
only way Talbot would perceive that the bus was stopping 
was the increasing size of the bus, i.e., the increasing 
portion of Talbot's "cone of perception" taken by the bus 
(738) •. Quinn testified that until Talbot was relatively 
close to the bus, it would not appear to him to be stopping 
(738, 750). At the point Talbot perceived that the bus was 
stopping it had suddenly become three times larger in his 
"cone of percept ion" (737). Quinn testified that the very 
purpose of tail lights is to warn a person in the rear of a 
slowing or stopping maneuver ( 7 38) • Without such lights, a 
slowing or stopping maneuver is very difficult to perceive 
until the driver in the rear is relatively close to the· 
stopping vehicle (738, 750). In fact, Quinn testified that 
- from the point where Talbot perceived the bus and reacted, 
he made the best possible effort to avoid the accident 
(740-41). 
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In addition to the foregoing evidence, reasonable minds 
could have decided that, under the circumstances of this 
case, Talbot was not negligent simply because he may have 
momentarily looked away from the road. 
Utah law requires that a vehicle have operating rear 
stop signal lights. 3 Additionally, Utah Law requires that a 
vehicle not stop upon the paved part of the highway when it 
is practical to stop off such paved part of ·the highway. 4 
While there was some evidence from which it could be 
inferred that the tail lights on the bus were operating, 
for purposes of testing the propriety of a directed finding 
of negligence against Talbot we must look at any evidence 
which would contradict or prevent such a finding. In that 
regard, as discussed above, there was substantial evidence 
that there were no bus tail lights operating at the time of 
the accident. 
As the purpose of requiring stop signal lights is to 
prevent just the type of accident which happened in this 
case, it follows that without stop signal lights, these 
3 
4 
Section 41-6-121.10, Utah Code Ann. (1953); Instruc-
tion No. 12 (251). 
Section 41-6-101, Utah Code An. (1953); Instruction 
No. 11 (249-50). 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
types of accidents can happen without any negligence on the 
part of the driver to the rear. 
Similarly, there was substantial evidence that Loosemore 
could have pulled the bus completely off the roadway. 5 The 
purpose of requiring a stopped vehicle to pull completely off 
the roadway is to prevent just the type of accident which 
occurred here. It follows that where a vehicle fails to pull 
off the roadway as required, and where that vehicle has no 
tail lights, these type of accidents can happen without any 
negligence on the part of the driver in the rear. 6 In 
this regard, Loosemore testified that he never saw the jeep 
5 
6 
Loosemore himself testified that on prior occassions 
he had pulled off the roadway at that point farther 
than he did at the time of accident (624). He testi-
fied that photographs taken at the scene showed that 
he could have pulled off the road 10 more feet (625). 
He testified that he stopped 3-4 feet from the waiting 
passenger (627). He stopped where it would be convenient 
for the passenger, rather than at a designated stopping 
area (139). 
Rudolph Limpert, accident reconstruction expert, testi-
fied that if the bus had pulled off even two additional 
feet, the accident would not have occurred (328). 
Officer Cragen testified similarly (529). 
Chief Carroll (503), Officer Cragen (518), and several 
others testified that there was room on the shoulder 
for the bus to have pulled completely off the roadway. 
In fact, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 shows a fire truck 
parked on the shoulder next to the bus. 
This is particularly true, where, as here, the road 
was posted for 50 m.p.h., was straight~ and had no 
semaphores or stop signs for several miles (529). 
-
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behind him prior to stopping, and that he had just stopped 
when he heard the screaching of brakes (629). He knew that 
his bus obstructed a substantial part of its lane (629). 
Finally, Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 18 Utah 
2d 1, 414 P.2d 88 (1966), demonstrates that negligence 
should not have been directed by the court in this case. 
Stapley involves nearly identical facts to the instant 
case. The day was clear1 the bus stopped with the right 
wheels about one foot off the highway: the bus could have 
pulled off farther onto a gravel and dirt shoulder, but did 
not do so for the convenience of the boarding passengers1 
any tail signal was obscured by dirt: and plaintiff, a 
passenger in the following car, was injured in a rear end 
collision with the bus. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
jury verdict for plaintiff, stating: 
[W]e think the competent admissible evidence 
favorable to the victor, as abstracted above, 
was such as justified reasonable men to 
arrive at the verdict. This certainly is not 
factually the strongest case in the world. 
We are constrained to believe we would have 
sustained a verdict for defendant, if it had 
been rendered. But under our rules of 
appellate review, where the jury is arbiter 
of the facts, negligence, contributory 
negligence, cause of the injury, and the 
like, we decide this case as we do. 
414 P.2d at 89 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Stapley case squarely holds that under nearly 
identical facts the jury, not the court, should decide the 
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facts, negligence and contributory negligence. It was there-
fore error for the court to have directed negligence against 
Talbot. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED DEFENDANT 
LOOSEMORE NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As discussed in Point I, infra, the jury was properly 
the arbiter of the facts and negligence. However, the court 
ruled Talbot negligent as a matter of law, and the evidence 
of Loosemore's negligence was at least as strong as Talbot's. 
Therefore, as the court ruled Talbot negligent, it should 
have also ruled Loosemore negligent. Plaintiffs moved the 
court for such a finding at the conclusion of defendants' 
evidence, which motion was denied (817). 
Several statutes set the standard of care required of 
Loosemore. Those dealing with pulling off the highway are 
discussed above. 
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 
243 P.2d 433 (1952), the court discussed the statute requir-
ing stopping off the highway, stating that it applied to 
those "cases where the driver stops his car on the highway 
from his own choice and has an opportunity to select the 
place and conditions of his stop." 243 P.2d at 434. 
-9-
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Many reported cases deal with statutes of other states 
which are identical in wording with 541-6-101, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). For e~~mple, Chard v. Bowen, 427 P.2d 568, 
572 (Idaho 1967), discusses those factors which might excuse 
compliance with the statute, stating: 
To prove that a violation of a statute 
was excusable or justifiable so as to overcome 
the presumption of negligence, the evidence 
must support a finding that the violation 
resulted from causes or things that made 
compliance with the statute impossible, some-
thing over which-the person charged with the 
violation had no control which placed his 
vehicle in a position violative of the statute, 
or an emergency not of such person's own mak-
ing by reason of which he fails to obey the 
statute, and that the person who violated the 
statute did what might reasonably be expected 
of a person of ordinary prudence who desired 
to comply with the law, acting under similar 
circumstances. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
Certainly in the instant case there was no evidence of 
the factors indicated in Chard which might excuse compliance 
with the statute. Therefore, a directed finding of negli-
gence was appropriate. 
The same conclusion was reached in Kelly v. Montoya, 
4 7 0 P. 2d 5 6 3 , 5 6 6 ( N. M • 1 9 7 0 ) : 
Since it is foreseeable that blocking 
the highway may cause other persons to have 
accidents, a violation of the statute which 
prohibits such blocking is negligence per se. 
There is no question that Loosemore could have pulled 
off the roadway the two additional feet which would have 
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prevented this accident. His failure to do so, in violation 
of the statute in question, was sufficient for a directed 
finding of negligence, particularly when such a finding was 
made as to Talbot. 
Additionally, Loosemore violated his duty to keep a 
lookout for persons, or other vehicles reasonably to be 
seen. 7 
Loosemore testified that by using his mirrors he could 
see all traffic behind him. Yet he testified that he 
failed to see Talbot's Jeep (629-30). 
Somehow he did see the light-colored station wagon 
next in line behind the Jeep, but he did not see Freston's 
pickup truck, Myers' car, or any of the cars behind Myers 
(618). Certainly Loosemore's failure to at least see the 
vehicle first affected by his maneuver, i.e. the Jeep, 
demonstrates negligence on his part in failing to keep a 
proper lookout. 
The evidence of Loosemore's failure to keep a proper 
lookout, and failure to pull off the roadway when he could 
have done so, is at least as compelling for a directed 
finding of negligence as a evidence regarding Talbot, and 
the court erred in refusing to so rule. 
7 Instruction to the Jury No. 11 (249-50) states this 
duty. 
-11-
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POINT III 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 IMPROPERLY LED THE 
JURY TO ITS CONCLUSION 
Instruction No. 14 (253) states in part: 
To be an independent intervening cause that 
would relieve another's negligence from being a 
proximate cause, it must be negligence that was 
not foreseeable. 
In that regard, you are instructed that the 
driver of the Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent 
as a matter of law, and if you find that he 
observed the bus stopped upon the highway, or, 
under the circumstances should have observed the 
bus, but because of his negligence failed to do so 
in time to avoid the accident, then you are 
instructed that the negligence on his part was the 
sole proximate cause of the collision. 
(Emphasis added). 
This instruction deals with both negligence and proxi-
mate cause. Certainly those two issues are difficult for a 
juror to separate. 
The cited portion of Instruction No. 14 leaves a juror 
with no reasonable alternative but to find Talbot solely 
liable. It holds Talbot negligent, and adds that if he 
should have seen the bus, but negligently failed to do so in 
time to avoid the accident, then he is solely liable. 
That statement of the law was expressly rejected in 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 
287 (1953): 
In applying the test of foreeseability to 
situations where a negligently created pre-existing 
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condition combines with a later act of negligence 
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-
cut distinction between two classes of cases. The 
first situtation is where one has negligently cri=' 
ated a dangerous condition [such as parking the 
truck] and a later actor observed, or circumstances 
are such that he could not fail to observe, but 
negligently failed to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later intervening 
actor who negligently failed to observe the 
dangerous condition until it is too late to avoid 
it. In regard to the first situation it is held 
as a matter of law that the later intervening act 
does interrupt the natural sequence of events and 
cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the 
initial actor. This is based upon the reasoning 
that it is not reasonably to be foreseen nor 
expected that one who actually becomes cognizant 
of a dangerous condition in ample time to avert 
injury will fail to do so. On the other hand, 
with respect to the second situation, where the 
second actor fails to see the danger in time to 
avoid it, it is held that a jury question exists, 
based on the rationale that it can reasonably be 
anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein 
others may not observe the dangerous condition 
until too late to escape it. The distinction is 
basically one between a situation in which the 
second actor has sufficient time, after being 
charged with knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, 
and one in which the second actor negligently 
becomes confronted with an emergency situation. 
263 P.2d at 292 (emphasis added). 
The court's instructions hold Talbot soley liable if he 
"should have observed the bus", a negligence standard. Hill-
yard specifically rejects that conclusion in its "second situ-
ation", cited above, where the second actor negligently failed 
to observe the dangerous condition until too late to avoid it. 
Hillyard was recently reaffirmed in Watters v. Querry, 
588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978). In Watters, the trial court gave 
an instruction similar to Instruction No. 14 in this case: 
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If a driver creates a dangerous condition with 
a motor vehicle, but this condition is such that 
another driver, exercising reasonable care, should 
have observed and avoided the dangerous condition, 
then the negligence of the later driver is an inde-
pendent intervening cause, and therefore the first 
driver cannot be a proximate cause of the collision. 
588 P.2d at 703. . 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the above instruc-
tion to be error. Watters required a clear instruction to 
the jury of the possibility that the first actor: 
should have foreseen that, in traffic such 
as there was on that highway, some momentarily 
inattentive driver following her would not be able 
to react and brake quick enough to avoid collision 
with her car or the car behind hers. 
Hillyard and Watters were recently reaffirmed in Jensen 
v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., No. 16417 (Utah 1980), 
in which the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for 
defendant, stressing the presence of a jury issue of 
foreseeability. 
Concededly Instruction No. 14 presents some foresee-
ability issues to the jury. However, it erroneously does so 
in the context of holding Talbot negligent as a matter of 
law, and it uses language rejected in Hillyard and Watters. 
Instruction No. 14 left the jury no choice but to find Talbot 
solely liable, which is the effect of their decision. 
Plaintiffs' submitted their proposed Jury Instruction 
No. 30 (354, 356), correctly stating the law in this regard, 
which the court rejected. 
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POINT IV 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, WERE 
IMPROPER OR INCOMPLETE, AND OVER-EMPHASIZED 
DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE. 
A. The court held Talbot negligent as a matter of 
law, but failed to instruct the jury that such negligence 
was in no way imputed to or attributable to plaintiff 
Matthew Harris, passenger in Talbot's Jeep. Caperon v. 
Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P.2d 402 (1941)1 Hudson v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357 (1951)1 Nyman v. Cedar 
City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961)1 Hall v. Blackham, 
18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). Such instruction was 
requested by plaintiffs in their proposed Instruction No. 
21 (343). 
B. There was no evidence of negligence on the part 
of plaintiff Matthew Harris. Plaintiffs requested that the 
court rule as a matter of law that Matthew Harris was not 
negligent, and to so instruct the jury in plaintiffs' pro-
posed Instructions No. 1 and 21 (321-22, 343). The court 
gave no such instruction. 
c. The court instructed the jury regarding defen-
dants' theory of the case in Instruction No. 14 (253). 
However, the court failed to instruct the jury as to plain-
tiffs' theory as requested in plaintiffs proposed Instruc-
tion No. 1 (321-22). 
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D. Although the court ruled that Talbot was negli-
gent as a matter of law, it did not instruct the jury to 
disregard the fact that Talbot was not a defendant in the 
case. Plaintiffs requested such an instruction in plain-
tiffs' proposed Instruction No. 20 (342). 
E. In questioning of several witnesses defendants' 
counsel elicited testimony that even though the bus blocked 
one southbound lane, a second southbound lane was unobstructed 
(For example, 532-33, 559-60). Such testimony could have 
been interpreted by the jury to have lessened or negated 
Loosemore's duty to have pulled completely off the roadway 
if practical to do so. In fact Loosemore's duty was in no 
way lessened by such fact. McElhaney v. Rouse, 415 P.2d 
241 (Kan. 1966). See also, Turner v. Silver, 587 P.2d 969 
(N.M. 1978); General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 
440, 243 P.2d 433 (1952). The court failed to give such an 
instruction although plaintiffs made such a request in 
plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 30 (355). 
The court's foregoing instructions, or failures to 
instruct, when taken together improperly and incompletely 
instructed the jury. When added to the court's finding that 
Talbot was negligent as a matter of law, the court's overall 
instructions improperly led the jury to its conclusion. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PLAINTIFFS' 
EXHIBITS NO. 42 AND 43. 
Plaintiffs offered into evidence Exhibits No. 42 and 
43 (224). These consisted of several relevant maintenance 
records or invoices of the involved bus for the time period 
subsequent to the accident, and a summary thereof (Exhibit 
43, the Summary, is located at page 441-42 of the Record). 
The court excluded both exhibits. The court's exclusion of 
these exhibits was error. 
Plaintiffs offered these exhibits for the purpose of 
demonstrating the possibility that the tail lights of the 
bus were not functioning at the time of the accident. This 
possibility was disputed by defendants. 
In Lawlor v. Flathead, 582 P.2d 751, 755 (Mont. 
1978), the court held such evidence admissable for the 
purpose of showing the existence of a condition: 
It is the general rule that evidence of 
subsequent repairs or precautions taken after an 
accident or injury is inadmissible as proof of 
negligence at the time of the accident or injury. 
29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, §275. However, where the 
evidence is not admitted as proof of negligence 
but, rather, to establish the physical conditions 
existing at the time of the accident such evidence 
may be properly admitted. 
Defendants presented evidence that the bus' tail 
lights were working when Linda Charlesworth Marx boarded 
the bus in North Ogden, several miles from the accident 
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scene (807). Loosemore testified that he turned on the 
"flashers" after the accident. Yet, plaintiffs presented 
several witnesses who testified that, at the time of the 
accident and immediately thereafter, there were no lights 
on the bus. 8 Chief Carrol testified that there were no 
lights when he arrived at the scene minutes after the acci-
dent, but that after he started taking photographs the lights 
came on (504-0S). 
Under these facts it was relevant to show subsequent 
electrical failures to demonstrate that there could have 
been such a failure at the time of the accident. 
The proposed exhibits showed, in part, that in May, 
1977, just over two months after the accident, the turn 
signals were out. In September, 1977, there was a short in 
the headlights. In October, 1977, the turn signals were 
out. In January, 1978, the right turn signal failed. In 
February, 1978, no turn signals. In March, 1978, no turn 
signals; two bad connections repaired. The very next day, 
the turn signals were out again; the mechanic repaired 
grounded wires (441-42). 
8 See Point I, infra. The braking maneuver of Loosemore, 
and his setting of the parking brake when he exited the 
bus should have activated the tail lights at all times 
relevant, unless a short or other failure intervened. 
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The foregoing repeated problems are evidence that a 
short or other problem could have existed at the time of the 
accident, resulting in the tail lights not functioning. 
Defendants adamantly denied such possibility. 
In Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal, 574 P.2d 856 (Ariz. 
1977), the court allowed similar evidence, holding that "the 
rule is well established that evidence of a particular fact 
before or after an act in question may be shown to indicate 
the existence of that same condition at the time of the 
accident." Id. at 860. 
The same conclusion was reached in Huxol v. Nickell, 
473 P.2d 90 (Kan. 1970). 
An additional ground was urged by plaintiffs at trial in 
support of the offered exhibits -- that the subsequent exis-
tence of electrical problems was evidence that the defendants 
had notice of the defect. In Phoenix v. Boggs, 403 P.2d 305 
(Ariz. 1965), the court reached the same conclusion as Lawlor, 
Circle K, and Huxol, supra. As an additional ground for 
admitting the evidence of subsequent conduct, the court in 
Boggs stated: 
However, even if we assume simply for the sake 
of argument, that defendant is correct in its con-
tention that the evidence introduced was inadmis-
sible to show what actually caused the injury, we 
would still be disposed to affirm the lower court's 
decision to admit this same evidence in order to 
show the prior and subsequent condition of Golden 
Lane which should have put the City of Phoenix on 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice that one of its streets was in a dangerous 
condition. That such is the law cannot be doubted. 
As the jury found no negligence on the part of the 
defendants, they must have determined that the tail lights 
of the bus were operating. See Instruction No. 12 (251). 
Plaintiffs' proposed maintenance exhibits were relevant 
evidence that the tail lights might not have been work-
ing at the time of the accident, and that defendant Utah 
Transit Authority had notice of said defect. Therefore, 
the court erred in excluding plaintiffs' Exhibits No. 42 
and 43. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in: 
1. Ruling Talbot negligent as a matter of law; 
2. Refusing to rule defendant Loosemore negligent 
as a matter of law; 
3. Improperly instructing the jury in its Instruc-
tion No. 14; 
4. Over-emphasizing defendants' case, or improperly 
or incompletely instructing the jury; and 
5. Excluding Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. 42 and 43. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse 
the Judgment of the trial court. 
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DATED this ~day of August, 1980. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ByPa~~zb~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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